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The ideas have a fundamental importance for world’s destiny. So, the scholar in economics has 
the consciousness responsibility to make the difference between correct and incorrect ideas. Within the 
human civilization world of thinking, the scientific ideas (universal truth) represent the essence of 
logical structure of human mind and, in the mean time, the truths about the human action and 
society that can be discovered by the man. In this approach, I will argue why the scholar honest 
mindedness must be his life principle. The scientific man can so understand and fight for healthy and 
correct ideas that protect life and human cooperation in society, against the incorrect ones that, sooner 
or later, will destroy them.  
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In the evolution of society, ideas represent the essential engine of every change. 
There are no implacable rules of history and the future is, neither written in stars, nor 
in  economics  and  cybernetics  modeling,  that  had  become  the  sterile  fashion  of 
economic journals – journals in which economics is the endangered scientific species. 
History, as well as future development of events, were and will be determined by 
ideas, those being false or true. Trade and the labor division, prosperity and social 
cooperation, poverty and political exploitation, the born of the state, the transition 
process  from  monarchy  to  democracy,  socialism  and  anti state  resistance,  the 
peaceful or violent fall of governments are examples that were and are the result of 
permanently competing and evolving ideas, depending on the way in which they are 
spread and fixed in people’s minds. 
The success of human actions fundamentally depends on ideas, on the way in 
which  ideas  and  ideologies  model  the  mental  constructions  used  by  people  for 
interpreting the world and for adopting decisions. However, not all the ideas are 
matching alike in ensuring the success and the economic development; if they would 
be so, they would become the neutral residual variable in any judgment of human 
action.  
The non neutrality of ideas for the world’s destiny makes the scientist to bear 
the responsibility to make a difference between the correct and the incorrect ideas. I 
do consider that in the amalgam of ideas belonging to human civilization, the correct 
scientific ideas represent the quintessence of human mind’s logical structure and, in 
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the same time, they constitute the truth about the world, truth that can be discovered 
by men. 
In this study I will bring my arguments with respect to why the good faith of the 
scientist must be his vital principle in order to supply and to defend the correct, 
healthy ideas that protect life, against those that, sooner or later, will destroy it. In the 
modern world built by and between state policies, the recent economist
1 as a policy 
maker bears an additional responsibility for the destiny of the ideas that he promotes. 
Finally, being Marxist, socialist, Keynesist, liberal, communitarian or something else, 
the “recent economist” discovers his faith in making a better world, being afterwards 
judged on the altar of science for the manner in which his ideas have influenced 
peoples’ lives. 
 
1. From the Theory of Relativity to Theory Relativization  
 
I cannot imagine science otherwise than a permanent effort of searching and 
identifying the truth and the fairness in life and society. Such a reporting to the 
methodical virtues of science necessarily and preliminary signifies that faith in the 
existence of truth and justice, as well as, in the power of human to approach these 
values is proved through judgment. This study represents a plea for the virtues of 
logic and faith in truth and justice. Moreover, the original signification of the word 
“science” – scientia – is correct knowledge. Bearing this clarification in mind, doubled 
by  the  faith  in  truth,  maybe  the  researchers  would  become  more  responsible  in 
calling any approach as being a “scientific” one and implicitly they would become 
more exigent with their own creations. 
Acquiring correct knowledge is not an axiomatic exercise in itself, aimed at building 
those judgments, ideas, theories that have the capacity to challenge time and space; to 
do science implies, in the same time, to discover and to eliminate all the errors that the 
human  mind  is  able  to  identify  and  eliminate,  fact  that  shows  the  necessity  of 
combating  the  erroneous  ideas  whose  imposition  and  popularization  generates 
poverty and conflict, as history shows. The example of failed “social engineering”, 
such  as  socialism  or  economic  nationalism,  proves  that  in  science  things 
unfortunately  happen  as  they  do  in  life:  not  always  scientists  that  deserve  to  be 
renowned are renowned and not always those that have a good reputation deserve it. 
I thus express my fear that the “relativist world” of the 20
th century, such as it was 
characterized by the famous historicist Paul Johnson, finds itself in the academic field 
under a relativism of knowledge, fact that easily undermined the credibility of the 
scientific intellectual exercise. 
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In contrast with the correct knowledge, it can be actually remarked a certain 
type of anti intellectualism that parasites not only the evolution of science, but also 
the culture – at the most general and sensible level of addressability. This worrying 
evolution can be translated through the abandonment of individual conscience in the 
“collective”  state  identity,  through  the  erosion  of  the  individual  autonomy  spirit, 
through  the  disaggregation  of  the  individual  by  today’s  mass  minorities  (ethnic, 
political, cultural, sexual etc.) The phrase “think with your own mind” had probably 
become out of fashion and in equal manner useless since the life and the human 
problems end up in ready mixed models in the social hierarchy. The scientific world 
itself  has  gradually  become  captive  of  a  sort  of  “scientism” whose  nature  finally 
proves to be “anti scientific”
1. Should it be all about a scientist assault over logic, 
over rational judgment? Or should it be about optimizing good by underlining bad? 
Not seldom can we remark the passive attitude of “what does it matter?” type, 
being  it  in  different  polls  or  in  academic  debates.  This  moral  and  intellectual 
relativism  –  which  is  born  even  in  prestigious  academic  labs  –  can  be  easily 
recognized in formulas like “nobody has monopoly over truth”, “each and every 
person is right in its own way”, as if justice and truth would in reality be mandatory 
derivations from the right of opinion. Thus, the relativist sustains that there is no 
assumption having universal content. 
In world’s vision about post modernity, the only faith is that no essential reality 
exists; that everything is relative or otherwise stated that there is no ultimate criterion 
for  making  hierarchies  in  order  to  distinguish  truth  from  false.  The  question  of 
concern  is whether  this  intellectual  relativism  perverts  the  full  affirmation  of  the 
human  personality  and  of  fair  social  institutions  or  disqualifies  the  scientific  act 
through popularizing in an interesting manner a faith that is obviously misleading, 
regarded through the eye of correct scientific knowledge. 
The confusion between the relativity theory and making the theory relative, as a 
method, has contributed to making both truth and justice relative – however these 
philosophical categories cannot ontologically exist separately. The word of order has 
become tolerance above the necessary human spirit: we gradually learned to tolerate 
ignorance, superficiality, lack of morality, even fraud – if it is legal and derives from 
the discretionary “democratic” governmental power. The inevitable consequence lies 
in the multitude of dilemmas that actually suffocate the moral and cultural values: 
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and to the public debate under the wrapping of “scientific product”. Irrespective of how logic or 
contradictory is the rationing in these writings, they are nonchalantly put under the scientific umbrella. 
As a result, it seems that everything one thinks about his/her object of research is scientific. Very 
often  completely  opposing  theories,  theories  that  offer  contradictory  explanations  for  the  same 
economic phenomenon, are tolerated as being “scientific” despite the fact that it is easily understood 
that not all writings are correlated with the correct knowledge of science. Clearly this gradually leads to 
the  decrease  in  the  value  of  science,  being  it  utopian  or  lacked  of  logic.  For  example,  the  term 
“scientific” was often used by Marx in order to distinguish himself from his ideological adversaries. 




cloning,  abortions,  ecological  problems,  euthanasia,  freedom  of  opinion,  arms 
possession, prostitution and homosexuality, immigration, social security, sustainable 
development, war and terrorism etc.  
The example of war is the illustration of the fact that many things which people 
knew and learned about, that were bad, are sometimes considered to be appropriate. 
The reciprocal is unfortunately valid as well regarding some ethical values that have 
ensured for centuries the very basis of the human civilization. In this manner arises 
the impossibility of stating a principle argument for or against ideas and phenomena, 
irrespective of how incorrect and lacked of logic they may be
1. 
These confusions mostly bear the mark of multiculturalism and postmodernism 
as central academic movements of the contemporary society. Steven Yates shows 
that the major anxiety of postmodernism has its source in the incertitude regarding 
the virtues of truth, fact that explains both the lack of interest and the refusal to 
accept  its  existence.  Under  these  circumstances  it  is  easily  understood  why  the 
academic discourse became captured by arbitrary, circumstantial arguments whose 
essence lies in interpreting whatever inequality as injustice and reducing the superior 
to inferior in all spheres of diversity. In the context of this harmonization tendency 
towards inferiority and egalitarianism, spreading the idea that participative democracy 
represents  the  indisputable  cure  for  all  the  problems  of  the  actual  society  highly 
contributed to consolidating a popular philosophy of indifference and superficiality.  
If the essence of relativism is that “everything is relative, there is no absolute 
truth”, what are the arguments standing for trusting this assumption? If the relativist 
would apply his doctrine starting with his own assumptions, following the hypothesis 
that there is no way to decide which position is correct and which is not, the result 
would be that the relativist axiom does not represent anything else than a simple, 
arbitrary game of words. What is then the use of the researchers’ efforts, struggling 
to formulate judgments, theories, fighting to amend certain rationing, as long as any 
theory is as good (relative) as anybody else’s?
2 
The intellectual absurdity of scientific relativism is expressed through the denial 
tendency of whatever elementary principles of analytic knowledge. This is exactly 
equivalent with the very denial of the natural laws of the human society, even of the 
laws  of  physics  that  describe  the  functioning  of  the  universe.  For  example, 
postulating the truth of an economic reasoning which is lastly deductible to trivial 
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formulating some principle arguments against some unfortunate events that flagellated the human 
civilization, such as war, socialism, holocaust… 
2 There exists the faith that the major purpose of the scientist is not to educate (that is to offer logical 
frames for the principles that save the human society from chaos, poverty and moral disorder) but to 
“open the minds of the young”. The problem lies in the fact that the mind of people can be opened 
up using different means, not all of them being equally desirable for the peaceful life of the individual 
in society. My plea is that we don’t have to be indifferent to the means in which the professors “open 
up the mind” of our children, if their “lessons” instigate to violence, racism, political exploitation, war, 




evidence (of the type of “1+1=2” axiom) is met with reserves, sometimes on the 
paradoxical ground that mathematicians did not say their final word regarding the 
validity of the arithmetic operation “1+1=2”
1. Such a credo undermines the scientific 
realizations that have been rooted over centuries in even the matrix of the human 
civilization. 
For example, we put the problem of the capacity of the scientist to answer the 
question “if a healthy apple plus a rotten one always equal two apples”. The anatomy 
of the above arithmetic shows a different result. For the scientist “1+1” will always 
equal “2” because the human mind is logically structured on the fundamental ground 
of “unity”. Moreover, the real scientist is the one that does not add up one healthy 
apple  with  a  rotten  one,  an  honest  person  with  a  criminal,  a  governed  with  a 
governor, an exploited person with an exploiter, etc. For scientific knowledge such 
an arithmetic exercise is not only irrelevant, but also a generator of confusion and 
error. However, for the politician, the implications of arithmetic are easily quantifiable. 
For example, by adding up a healthy apple with a rotten one, he may declare that … 
the standard of living has increased; by adding up the millions of the millionaire with 
the zeros of the beggar, the politician will say that the “society” is generally ok! 
The  postmodernist  thinking  managed  to  forget  whole  centuries  of  rational 
thinking, periods of systematically employing the logic in the search for truth. The 
Greek idea that something precise can be said only about the things that are time 
independent  dominated  the  philosophical  thought  until  modernity  decided  to 
embrace  Nietzsche’s  request  for  “revaluing  all  the  values”
2.  In  the  post modern 
world the humans are not convinced that gaining knowledge is a good thing in itself. 
For  Aristotle  knowledge  offers  power;  Francis  Bacon  is  the  one  that 
programmatically postulated that “knowledge is power”. Being in the middle of the 
process  of  “democratically  revaluing  all  the  values”,  the  contemporary  society 
reversed the identity of Bacon into “power is knowledge in the same time”. If the 
pre industrial society had understood the identity towards science, the post industrial 
society  interpreted  science  as  power
3.  As  Zygmunt  Bauman  (1992:VII)  writes, 
                                                 
1 For the extreme relativist, the result of a mathematical operation is arbitrary, “1+1” could equal “3”, 
“100”, “1176” and (why not?) an infinite. Do we make a mistake when we teach our children in 
schools that “1+1=2” or that, according to elementary logic, “you cannot eat this pie and keep it for 
later in the same time”? If the relativist says that “1+1” may equal “5”, would he be willing to give up 
a banknote of 500 EUR in exchange for 2 banknotes of 100 EUR in order to protect his own credo? 
Even in the situation in which he would accept this monetary sacrifice, wouldn’t he just diminish the 
means employed for his own purposes, thus contrary to his credo? 
2  The  classical  Greek  thought  culminating  in  the  works  of  Aristotle  who  gave  the  Westerners  a 
profound rationalist attitude: the perception of humans as rational animals, the highest respect for logic 
and logical thought, a strong faith in the existence of the natural law and of the cognoscibility of 
human and nature, a strong realism and the “human spirit” (Hoppe, 1997). 
3 Thus, postmodernism has its roots in the complete politicizing of the social life, as H.R. Patapievici 
(2001:133) shows: “the essence of the postmodern agenda (…) is fundamentally politic. However, the 
political scope of the postmodern assertion is to remove any reference to universal and to bring the 




“Postmodernism… does not aim at substituting one truth with another one, one 
beauty standard with other, one life ideal with other. More than this, it divides the 
truth, the standards and the ideas in parts that have lost their structure and parts that 
will lose their structure. (…) He proclaims himself for a life without truth, standards 
or ideals”. 
The removal of ideals, faiths and criteria manifests in recent times mostly in 
which regards the relation between science and deity. The scientific objectivity that 
protects a lot of utopia has to exclude all that it does not assume. Not randomly have 
scientists and reputed intellectuals from recent history less things in common with 
ethics than with atheism
1. This tendency appears due to the fact that the scientific 
idea is not to believe in God, and thus the perception that God does not exist. 
Science  cannot  identify  God,  because  it  excludes  Him  from  the  start  and  any 
demonstration cannot find just the things it assumed in the beginning hypotheses: 
“the argument of revelation critics is thus circular: in order to prove the falsity of the 
Bible, they assumed from the very beginning that the Bible is fake, that, otherwise 
stated,  the  Bible  cannot  base  itself  on  the  existence  of  miracles”  (Patapievici, 
2002:71). However, despite the fact that early Christianity, including the Bible, had an 
ambivalent attitude, sometimes even contradicting economic laws, the religious faith 
is almost always put into an ethical juridical framework that the economist cannot 
ignore, as I will prove in the final part of this study. 
One of the important sources of the scientific relativism, especially in the field 
of social sciences, lays in the fact that history rather than theory is the one that 
managed to attract attention. Each individual, each tribe, each population, was seen 
as owner of its own history. Since no absolute standards of good and bad existed 
back  then,  all  histories  were  appreciated  as  being  equally  valuable  (historical 
relativism). Through history it was not intended the expression of some judgment 
about the past or forecasting the future, but the revelation of multiculturalism, of 
human tradition diversity. Hans Hermann Hoppe (1997:1) writes that “according to 
historicism,  there  is  nothing  “good”  or  “bad”  from an  ethical  point  of view,  all 
ethical judgments being considered subjective. Moreover, with the possible exception 
of logic, mathematics, and natural sciences laws, there are no positive universal laws. 
Economics and sociology are just a history, a sequence of past actions and events of 
which you can learn nothing else than the fact that “that’s the way things happened”. 
The new political and cultural universe of modern society leaves no room for 
the  traditional  conception  regarding  logic,  which  is  that  logic  is  the  same  for 
everybody, since the human nature is the same, irrespective of the skin color, sex, 
nationality,  religion,  etc.  Gradually,  the  multiculturalism  doctrine  transformed  the 
very idea of logic, considering that logic is no longer the same for everybody, but a 
multi polar logic, derived not from universal criteria, but from sexual, cultural, ethnic 
                                                                                                                                      
serious  researcher,  would  seem  to  the  great  public  and  to  the  intellectual  community  as  dual, 
dangerous and fundamentalist as a return to God’s church today, in the democratic politics. 






A new faith seems to dominate the academic thought of the last century; I am 
talking  about  the  doctrine  that  Ludwig  von  Mises  identifies  through  the 
denomination of polylogisme. This appears as the conjugated result of historicism 
and  empiricist  positivism,  philosophies  that  in  fact  undermine  the  a priori 
methodological basis of economic science. For example, historicism assumes that the 
logical structure of human mind and of the thinking process is subject to change 
during the historical evolution, whereas the racial polylogisme attributes to each race 
its own logic. In essence, the central thesis of polylogisme, in its Marxist version, is 
that there are two types of logic, one for the occidental civilization and one for the 
cultures that are subject to its “exploitation”, or, in relativist version, that there is 
logic for each culture and historical context. However, as the economic science and 
history proved, the Marxist polylogisme is a failed strategy to save the unsustainable 
doctrines of socialism, through the substitution of logical reasoning with intuition, 
attractive attempt for those inclined to popular superstitions? This is the reason for 
which Mises (1966:85) shows that “the attitude puts the Marxist polylogisme and its 
product, “the sociology of knowledge”, in an irreconcilable antagonism vis à vis the 
science and the reasoning”. 
For example, the idea that Marxism is a science appears strongly rooted in the 
intellectual  environment  of  many  countries,  especially  in  the  countries  that  had 
something to do with the socialist experiment, despite its dramatic failure. The great 
historic Paul Johnson (2002:82) shows that the phenomenon spread also in the non 
Marxist world, “due to the fact that intellectuals, and especially academicians, are 
fascinated by power, whereas the identification of Marxism with a powerful physic 
authority  tempted  several  professors  to  accept  the  Marxist  “science”  in  their 
disciplines,  especially  in  the  non exact  or  quasi exact  fields  such  as  economics, 
sociology,  history  and  geography”.  It  is  possible  that  if  the  war  for  Central  and 
Eastern Europe would have been gained by Stalin rather than Hitler, thus ending up 
with the implementation of his own policies over a great part of the world, the Nazi 
doctrine (which pretended itself to be  scientific, according to the racial theory it 
sustained)  would  have  had  an  academic  allure  and  would  have  entered  all  the 
universities in the world. The military victory however ensured the imposition of the 
Marxist “science”
2. However, what can be “scientific” in Marx’s writings or in the 
Nazi doctrine? The undesired experiment of the “rationally planned society” meant 
                                                 
1  For  example,  the  Marxist  theory  suggests  that  the  human’s  thinking  is  determined  by his  class 
affiliation. Each social class would have inherited its own logic. The products of thought can thus be 
nothing else but an “ideological mask” of egoistic class interests of the thinker. In the Marxist opinion, 
the Ricardian theory of comparative costs has no fundaments due to the fact that Ricardo was a 
bourgeois. German racists condemn the same theory due to the fact that Ricardo was a Jew, whereas 
German nationalists do the same on the ground that he was British. 
2 The arrival of nihilism for Nietzsche and the distributive logic of capitalism for Marx seem to have 
the same signification, such that “if the philosophic prophet of postmodernism was Nietzsche, its 




in reality the exit of the human society from the human framework and its regression 
back in history, in the animal world of slavery, totalitarianism and state exploitation. 
In the middle of these problems has gradually appeared the less desired idea that 
ethical standards represent simple social conventions, fact that would impede the 
possibility of ethically validating a multitude of “alternative institutional arrangements”. 
However, the contradiction comes from the very fact that this approach ignores the 
exigencies  of  the  simplest  test:  the  uniqueness  character  and  the  universality  of 
human nature, of natural laws to which the entire human being conforms to. In this 
sense, the universal charter of human rights made history not because it referred to 
“people” and attributed them “rights”, but because it strongly and finally assumed 
that the human rights are written in his very nature and are thus universal. The fact 
that there are relativists sustaining the human rights that do not even realize the 
inconsistency  of  their  position,  represents  the  typical  confusion  of  post modern 
epoch. (Patapievici, 2001:401). 
It is irrefutable the fact that the polylogist argument represents nothing else than 
a dissembled attack towards the economic science, a relativist exercise of sublimating 
the  “correct  knowledge”,  especially  in  the  field  of  economic  policies.  Socialists, 
racists,  nationalists  and  statists  failed  in  their  attempts  to  reject  the  economists’ 
theories  and  to  prove  the  correctness  of  their  mystifying  doctrines.  This  very 
frustration is the one that stimulated them to deny the logical and epistemological 
principles on which the entire human thinking is based, both in economic activities 
and in scientific research
1. In the end, the validity of a priori fundaments of logic and 
economic  science  cannot  be  proven  without  making  a  reference  to  these  very 
fundaments.  Rationality  is  the  primary,  natural  given  of  the  human  being,  the 
existence  as  such  of  human  rationality  being  itself  a  non rational  fact.  The  only 
assumption that can be formulated with respect to reasoning is that it represents the 
distinctive  feature  that  separates  men  from  animals  and  that  attracts  with  it 
everything that is specific to humans. 
Rationality is, in fact, the only method that researchers have at their disposal, the 
same method through which can be argued the inacceptable character of scientific 
relativism and through which can be proven that there are positive universal laws of 
(economic) science and ethical truths on which the human civilization is grounded. 
                                                 
1 The real scientist is not allowed to reject the “relativist objections” (a flagrant contradiction in fact) 
only through invoking the partisan prejudices that inspired them. In order to discover the errors, the 
scientist has no other arsenal than logic, the only mental instrument that can stay at the basis of 
“correct knowledge”. Ludwig von Mises (1966:91) shows that “to remove a theory through invoking 
its historical origins, the “spirit” of the times in which it was formulated, the material conditions from 
its country of whatever personal particularities of its authors is a helpless strategy. A theory is not 
subjected  but  to  the  tribute  of  reasoning.  The  adequate  criterion  for  analyzing  it  is  always  the 
reasoning criterion. A theory is either correct or incorrect. It is possible that in the actual state of our 
knowledge not to have the possibility to decide regarding its fairness or lack of fairness. However a 
theory can never be valid for both a bourgeois and an American and invalid for a proletarian and a 




Obviously I do not want to suggest the fact that rationality can ever make a man 
know everything. Irrespective of how much would knowledge increase, there will 
always  be  things  having  the  statute  of  last  data,  which  are  not  destined  to  any 
additional clarifications. The only sure thing is that rationality and science can foster 
human progress and are able to prepare a future of good and justice. 
 
2. … about the method(logy) of economic science 
 
The  most  significant  errors  committed  in  the  economic  science  have 
methodological and epistemological roots. In time, these errors get to reciprocally 
maintain themselves and to perpetuate. This is the reason for which I will further on 
stop to investigating these aspects. The implicit scope is to understand that methodo 
logy, that is the logic of the economic science, is based on the natural laws of human 
action, as I will further on show. 
The  contemporary  philosophy  of  science  is  in  great  part  a  reaction  against 
empiric, logical positivism and the ideas of Karl Popper, approaches that however 
remained sufficiently influent between philosophers of science and economists
1. The 
empiric position, as general approach, that includes the logic positivism is based on 
the assumption that no theory can exist in the absence of observations, that a theoretical 
statement is true only if it is based on a non theoretical ground, thus on observations. 
The  attitude  towards  economic  science  fuelled  by  positivism  is  that  of  the 
relativist  social  engineer,  whose  motto  is  “nothing  can  be  thoroughly  proved  as 
impossible in the field of social sciences”. It is no doubt that this message has been 
rapidly interpreted by the political power as an important ideological arm through 
enhancing both the politicizing of science and the control over the society. As a 
consequence, a strong political support has been given to the positivist movement, 
who “returned the favor by destroying ethics and economic science – traditional 
pillars of the social rationalism” (Hoppe, 1997). 
The empiric and positivist philosophy is based on the next thesis: knowledge 
regarding reality, known as empirical knowledge, has to be verifiable or, at least, 
falsifiable  through  experience;  if,  mutatis  mutandis,  knowledge  is  not  verifiable  or 
                                                 
1 Taking into account the repeated “non realism” complaints brought to the economic theory, the 
Friedmanian methodology of logical positivism is based on the idea that the positive science means 
“the development of a “theory” or “hypothesis” able to offer available and significant predictions (not 
reducible  to  truisms)  about  phenomena  not  yet  observed”  (Milton  Friedman,  1953,  „The 
Methodology of positive economic science", in Daniel M. Hausman, ed., The Philosophy of Economic 
Science, Ed. Humanitas, Bucharest, 1993, p. 193). In his powerful essay, despite the fact that Friedman 
explicitly and justifiably rejects empirics, he argues for an instrumentalist point of view over science, 
according to which the goals of economic theory are predictive rather than explanatory. According to 
the general Friedmanian argument, the theory is validated (or alternatively non falsifiable) through its 
capacity to formulate “correct predictions”: “the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is 
comparing  its  predictions  with  experience”  (Friedman;  1993:196).  This  means  that  in  a  strictly 




falsifiable  through  experience,  than  it  is  not  knowledge  about  reality  (empirical 
knowledge),  but  analytical  knowledge,  which  should  not  even  be  considered 
knowledge as such. It is not at all obvious that logic, mathematics, geometry and 
assumptions of pure economics – as for example the law of demand and supply, the 
quantitative theory of money – would not offer information about reality and would 
be pure verbal games, because they do not allow for falsification through experience, 
or rather because their validation is independent of experience. More exactly, the 
assumptions of these disciplines – as for example the geometrical statements such as 
“a  triangle  has  three  sides”  contain  information  about  reality,  information  about 
things  that  could  not,  without  contradiction,  be  otherwise  in  reality  (Marinescu, 
2004:38). 
By adopting an empiric epistemology according to which there is nothing in 
reality that can be really known before some future experiences, that is able to attract 
confirmation or falsification, is in fact equivalent with the impossibility of validating a 
principle argument, universal and categorical
1. 
The credo of logical positivism that “only experience is able to lead to synthetic 
assumptions” becomes contradictory through the fact that this very assumption is an 
analytical  one,  synthetic  a  priori,  because  its  truth  cannot  be  established  through 
experience. Such an epistemological position of a priori knowledge through purely 
conceptual  and  deductive  rationing  constitutes  the  scientific  realization  of  the 
Austrian school of economics. Ludwig von Mises is the one that argued that the 
fundamental assumptions of economic theory are synthetic truths a priori. Economics 
thus designs a theoretical and systematic science, not a historical one. Its assumptions 
are  not  derived  from  experience;  they  are  a  priori  deductible  and  conceptual 
assumptions, similar with those of logics and mathematics
2. The fact that the humans 
do not have the creative power to imagine categories incompatible with the relations 
of  fundamental  logic  and  with  the  principle  of  causality  shows  the  necessity  of 
adopting a methodological apriorism. The aprioric character of science does not open the 
development perspective of a future science; we do not sustain in this respect that 
economic science should be aprioric, but that it is and it has always been like this. 
From the Christian Middle Age until the illuminist 17
th and 18
th centuries, a 
systematic body of economic theory has been developed, strongly connected with 
the development of a “normative” theory of natural rights. This has culminated in 
                                                 
1 Hoppe (1989:101) shows that, irrespective to the empirical errors of socialism, “once an empiric 
positivist theory has been adopted, that is once the idea of formulating a principle argument for or 
against socialism is put aside […] socialism becomes immune to all decisive critics” because any failure 
can be justified through different variables, still uncontrolled details of the socialist politics. Moreover, 
when adopting an empiric philosophy it may be pretended that even the general argument of the 
impossibility of economic calculus in socialism cannot constitute strong evidence against the failure of 
socialist planning. 
2 Mises (1966:36) argues that these assumptions “are not subject to verification or falsification based 
on facts or experience. They are, both logically and temporally, antecedents of whatever understanding 




the  writings  of  Cantillon  and  Turgot.  According  to  this  intellectual  tradition  – 
continued in the 19
th century by Say, Senior, Cairnes, Menger and Böhm Bawerk and 
in  the  20
th  century  by  Mises,  Robbins  and  Rothbard  –  economic  science  was 
understood as the “logic of human action”, as a theory of human behavior, as most 
economics  books  prescribe  today.  Starting  with  axiomatic  assumptions  and 
combining them with a couple of empirical and empirically verifiable sentences, the 
economic science has been conceived as an axiomatic deductive science, whereas 
economic theories were seen as assumptions that are in the same time both realist 
and non hypothetical, that is they are true a priori
1. Even if these theorems contain 
information  regarding  reality,  they  are  not  hypothetical  statements  –  empirically 
falsifiable – but they are true through their very nature. 
As opposed to the methodology of physical and natural sciences – mainly built 
on observation – the nature of economic science makes the validity of the theories 
not to be appreciated on the basis of empirical investigations
2. Economic theory is 
not and can never be empirical in a positivist sense; it cannot base its assumptions on 
hypotheses  than  can  or  cannot  be  true,  in  the  best  case  being  all  about  the 
approximation of reality. Economic laws are a priori laws that cannot be confirmed 
by using natural sciences methods. 
 
                                                 
1 As for example there are some economic assumptions: in any voluntary exchange both partners 
necessarily anticipate that they will have something to win from the exchange because they attribute 
non equal values to the goods subject to the exchange – each of them attributes a higher meaning 
(value) to the other’s good than to its own; otherwise the exchange would be nonsense. Another 
example is: every time laws of minimum wage that make compulsory wages higher than those that 
would exist on the free market are instituted, involuntary unemployment appears. Another example: 
when the quantity of money is increased and the demand for money remains constant, the money 
purchasing power will decrease. Another example: whatever quantity of money is equally “optimal” 
such that no increase in the supply of money will, on the long run, lead to an increase in economic 
welfare, but will generate redistributive consequences. Another example: state property over factors of 
production makes the calculus of costs impossible, fact that explains the impossibility of economic 
calculus and leads to an arbitrary allocation of resources. 
2 Economic theories that are both built and verified empirically, on an observatory basis, cannot be 
valid, correct in general, but only in isolated cases. Moreover, such a method of making “science” has 
received irrecoverable damage. This is the famous and equally amusing case of the “theory of solar 
spots” through which William Jevons – an important name in economic theory – argued the business 
cycles explanation. Equally paradoxical is the manner in which some economists and politicians (see 
the public agenda recently created in Romania) invent extra economic justifications for inflation. If the 
statistic analysis shows that in good agricultural years inflation was lower, than the empiric economist 
will hurry to conclude that there is a causal effect between weather and inflation. Thus the public 
opinion  will  be  manipulated  towards  thinking  that  the  inflation  responsibility  has  to  be  divided 
between the Central Bank (as public organisation that has monopoly over the issue of currency) and 
God. Every time a healthy economic culture lacks among the public opinion, an inflationary monetary 
policy can be “rescued” by invoking God’s will. If monetary policy was accidentally more responsible 
in good agricultural years, this does not imply that inflation theory has to be built around the natural 
and divine factors. Inflation is an exclusively monetary phenomenon, created by men rather than 




What  essentially  differentiates  the  human  being  from  the  exterior  natural 
universe is the freedom of choice: people are aware of their actions and are able to 
change  their  course  through  different  options.  In  contrast,  the  elements  of  the 
physical  universe  do  not  have  the  capacity  of  choosing  their  own  trajectory: 
molecules, planets, etc. follow a strict, mechanically determined path. If the physical 
scientist can accurately establish the position of the Moon in comparison with the 
Earth at a certain future point in time, the data is much more complicated and almost 
impossible to control with respect to human action or to entrepreneurial initiative; in 
the field of human action and social phenomena that are subordinated to incertitude 
the ex post accuracy of the forecast can be nothing but randomly. 
Thus there is the necessity for every social science – as a science of humans – to 
base  its  explanations  starting  from  the  capacity  of  every  human  being  to  make 
choices. The only ex ante accurate forecast is to know the fact that the individuals 
deliberately use means (those that each consider to be the most appropriate) in order 
to reach their goals, whatever they may be. The answer to the questions why and how 
individuals  choose  their  objectives  do  not  represent  the  subject  of  interest  of 
economic science, these being investigation problems in the field of psychology. 
The essence of social science is the man that acts: the individual human being, having its 
own aspirations and ideas regarding the most adequate means to be employed for 
satisfying his purposes, whose actions are not governed by quantitative, determinist 
physical laws. In this respect, the statements that interpret individual action as the 
expression  of  an  organic  collective  will  are  well  known:  “society  determines  the 
actions of men that compose it”; moreover, economics textbooks, mostly those that 
justify  some  collectivist  policies,  are  full  of  confuse  concepts,  most  of  them 
impossible from a logical point of view, as for example “general interest”, “strategic 
interest” or “social utility”. But was is “general” and for whom is “strategic”, in this 
case
1? 
Gradually, the intensification of using abstract collective concepts – especially 
the use of the term “society” with the meaning of a distinct entity that “thinks”, 
“feels”, “acts” as a person – undermined the rigor of economic analysis and even of 
the social research. Once it is understood that actions are exclusively individual, this 
perspective becomes almost absurd: if society is responsible for the criminal acts, than the true 
                                                 
1 Politicians can more easily promote the “legitimacy” of their policies by arguing that these address 
the “national interest”. Any political programme assumes a glorious title because it is designed to serve 
the “national interest”; it is however strange that the contradictory policies applied – justified through 
different ideological positions – can finally end up in serving the same “public interest”. Most of the 
time  history  showed  us  that  hidden  behind  the  scientifically  meaningless  assumption  of  “general 
interest”,  plenty  of  governors  sacrificed  the  prosperity  of  their  countries’  citizens  in  order  to 
materialize their thirst of political power. The reality of the contemporary democracy shows us that 
the  “national  interest”  significantly  changes  its  nature  from  one  political  mandate  to  the  other, 
together  with  the  change  of  the  holders  of  political  power,  those  that  govern  the  states.  Even 
socialism and other forms of dictatorial governments were justified through invoking the “national 




“guilt” is born by those that never commit crimes. Moreover when it is pretended that the 
academic environment is the one that “produced” a certain scientific work, it results 
that all those that work in that specific field have to receive prizes, together with the 
author that signed the respective intellectual product.  
The history of social sciences confirms the fact that the individualistic vision over 
the human nature is the common root of all the theoretical assumptions about men 
and  society,  against  any  other  holistic  approach.  Methodological  individualism  is 
based on the fundamentally praxeological conception according to which human action 
is  always  exclusively  individual  and  considers  the  individual  as  the  essential  unit  of 
analysis, whose behavior has to be studied
1. Only man as individual person can have 
goals and not the “country”, the “nation”, etc. “Society” is not “somebody” to have 
goals, preferences, a specific way of life, conscience, etc. Nobody can exemplify the 
manner in which society lives other than by looking at the actions of the individuals. 
Talking  about  the  independent  existence,  life,  soul  and  autonomous  actions  of  a 
society constitutes a metaphor that can easily lead to serious errors. From this very 
reason the question whether the individual or the society represent the end goal 
whose  interests  have  to  be  subordinated  to  the  interests  of  the  other  becomes 
irrelevant. The category of goal (interest, objective) does not have a meaning but 
when it is applied to action, whereas human action is exclusively individual. 
The  Smithonian  plea  according  to  which  nothing  is  necessary  besides  the 
following of the personal interest for obtaining general prosperity is eloquent; the 
market  is  thus  the  institutional  framework  for  realizing  the  harmony  of  individual 
interests. The free market system, in which the gain of one is the reward for offering 
services to the others, is based on social cooperation, not on force and coercion: it is 
a  participative  system  of  society  in  which  each  individual  is  respected  because 
nobody in particular receives favors. In opposition to the system of political power 
and its corollary, the taxation does not function on a contractual basis, similar with 
the voluntary nature of exchange on the market. Where is thus the harmony between 
the politicians’ interests, the bureaucracy of the state apparatus, to manipulate as 
many  coercion taken  resources  through  taxes,  and  the  interest  of  the  tax payers 
(from the private sector) to share with the others as little as possible from their 
work? 
A frequent error that derives from the same methodological derivate is made 
both by the adversaries and by the supporters of the market economy when they 
pretend  that  the “market  is  impersonal”.  Some  complain  about  the  fact  that  the 
market is too impersonal because “she” does not produce the outcomes that they 
desire. Is “the market” guilty? I do not know this person! The market is not an entity 
                                                 
1 According to the examples given by Mises (1966:43) the state is not the one that executes the 
murderers, but the executioners, through their concrete actions. Despite the fact that it is understood 
that a specific nation conquered a territory, that conquest cannot be perceived besides the individual 
actions of officers and military from that specific army, individual persons that have individual will 




that  takes  suitable  or  undesired  decisions.  The  concept  of  “market”  does  not 
represent  anything  else  than  a  label  to  name  a  system  of  voluntary  interactions 
between persons, individuals that have property rights over the exchanged goods. No 
“automatic”  or  “anonymous”  forces  activate  the  market  “mechanism”.  The  only 
factors that “guide” the market and determine the price are human actions. There is 
no type of automatism; there are just individuals that deliberately follow sought ends 
and deliberately employ certain means for their attainment. On the free market the 
bad results of one individual reside from the fact that his suppliers do not desire to 
sell  cheaper  and/or  his  clients  to  buy  more  expensive,  legitimate  economic  fact 
taking into account their property rights and their “maximizing calculus”. 
Lately, the consequence of holism that gradually became methodological is that 
the economic theory has been subject to “modelization”, that is to the obsessive 
need of building “models” of the economy and its functioning. The absolute reversal 
of the methodological approach appears on the ground of the demands of more and 
more  modern  economists  that  economic  theory can  be interpreted  following  the 
same  quantitative  treatment  as  physical  sciences:  the  original  motto  of  the 
Econometrics Society is “science means measuring”.  
But  how  can  we  measure  the  value  of  one  good?  Can  we  measure  them  by 
employing goods or the monetary units that an individual accepts in order to give up 
to them? Definitely not. The exchange as a market phenomenon appears as long as 
each participant evaluates the good that is about to receive as being more valuable 
than the good he is about to give up to. The exchange is necessarily an exchange of 
unequal  values,  at  least  in  an  ex ante  anticipated  stage.  This  means  that  voluntary 
exchange is mutually beneficial in the sense that both participants appreciate that they will 
better  satisfy  their  needs  through  the  exchange  than  without  it;  otherwise  the 
exchange would loose whatever reason for existing. 
If  a  student  decides  to  give  up  a  certain  sum  of  money  for  an  economics 
textbook we can say that for him the book “values” more than its monetary price 
(“monetary value”) or more than other goods that can be bought with the same 
amount of money. But with what value does the book overcome the other goods 
that the student has given up to? There is no possibility to solve this problem since 
the  value  is  a  subjective  economic  category.  The  conclusion  is  that  the  exercise  of 
measuring value is sterile and the currency cannot have the function of value standard. 
These  arguments  exclude  the  erroneous  idea  that  comes  from  Marxism  and  is 
strongly spread in today textbooks, that in an exchange each good is “the measure” 
of the other. 
In the same context, despite the neo classical “models” met in most economics 
textbooks
1, marginal utility cannot be a mathematically measurable quantity, by using 
                                                 
1 In the academic field the economic thought has been captivated by the Paul Samuelson’s Economics 
textbook. This is one of the most successful textbooks ever published in the economic field, together 
with the writings of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall. The fifteen 




the so called “utile”, unities that can be added up, subtracted and be subject to other 
mathematical operations. Marginal utility relates to a strictly ordinal classification, 
according to which each person classifies his actions and the goods according to the 
hierarchy  of  his  preferences, without  actually  having  a  measurement  unit for  the 
value  of  these  goods.  In  terms  of  proved  preferences,  choices  reflect  just  pure 
orderings  that  do  not  reveal  the  differences  of  amplitude  between  the  goods’ 
positions in the hierarchies of value. 
If it is nonsensical to say that “utility can be measured” than, more lacked of 
meaning is the attempt to compare the utilities of different individuals. However, 
interpersonal utility comparisons represent the manner in which statist and egalitarian 
economists manipulated the utility theory over the last century. If we can say that the 
marginal utility of a dollar decreases once the individual accumulates more dollars, 
then can we also state that the government can increase the “social utility” by taking 
one dollar with such a low value from a rich person and offering it to the poor 
person, that values it more? The proof that utilities cannot be measured completely 
eliminates the scientific fundament of the redistributive policies. However, despite 
the  fact  that  economists  generally  adhere  to  the  idea  that  the  utilities  cannot  be 
compared  between  individuals,  they  do  not  hesitate  to  add  and  subtract  “social 
benefits” and “social costs”. A proof in  this  respect is the amount of economic 
studies that scientifically evaluate the gains and the losses of welfare at the level of 
the entire society or the national economy. 
                                                                                                                                      
languages (see Skousen, 1997, pg. 137 152). Unfortunately the neo classical apology of Samuelson 
raised a lot of analytic and methodological confusion in the economic science. The manner in which 
Samuelson’s ideas evolved is interesting, in the fifteen editions of the textbook, in essential problems 
for economic theory as the Keynesian model, savings, monetary policy, the role of government in 
society,  socialism  and  economic  growth.  If  in  the  first  editions  only  Keynes  was  presented  in  a 
biographical note, being called “multilateral genius”, in the 7th edition (1967) Samuelson marks the end 
of the Keynesian domination by citing Milton Friedman’s statement from the Time magazine: “all of 
use the language and the analytical Keynesian apparatus; however no one of us accepts the initial 
conclusions of Keynesists”. Moreover, the perspective in which Samuelson presents savings evolves 
from the Keynesian dogma of the “paradox of savings”, when Samuelson expresses his hear that an 
increase of the marginal propensity to savings would cause the leakage of money from the system, 
thus  transforming  savings  into  a  “social  vice”,  to  the  classical  vision  according  to  which  a  high 
marginal propensity to savings determines a high propensity to investments (in the 14th edition, the 
scheme of the savings’ leakage has been taken out). Being a defender of the activist government and of 
the welfare state, Samuelson culminates with the doubts he had regarding the economic performance of 
socialism; starting with the 5th edition until the 11th one, Samuelson presents a graphic that shows the 
distance  between  USA  and  USSR  decreasing  and  possibly  even  disappearing  (for  example  5th 
edition:830). In the 13th edition (1989), Samuelson and Nordhaus declared that “the soviet economy is 
the proof of the fact that […] a planned socialist economy can function and even prosper” (13:837). 
After the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, Samuelson invoked the ability of the soviets 
to manipulate the statistics, declaring communism in the 15th edition a “failed” system. It is however 
surprising how a Nobel laureate as Samuelson proved such a high degree of ignorance to Ludwig von 
Mises’s argument according to “the impossibility of economic calculus in socialism”, according to which 




The  legitimating  of  interpersonal  welfare  comparisons  and  the  doctrine  of 
methodological  holism  strongly  contributed  to  the  systematic  expansion  of 
government in society. The second half of the 20
th century remarked itself through 
the unprecedented enthusiasm of activist policies for public spending: the challenges 
of socialism together with the recommendations of the Keynesist theory and the 
externalities  and  public  goods  theory  stimulated  this  evolution
1.  Moreover,  the 
ascension of democracy favored the identification of the state with society. Historical 
studies  show  that  most  of  the  time  the  republican  democratic  states  used  the 
constitutional provisions in order to build their own prestige. Probably the famous 
sentence of Lincoln “of the people, by the people, for the people” was the most powerful 
propaganda strike that was ever given for supporting the prestige of the state. 
However the capital sin of statism is the faith that the government can solve 
whatever problems of individuals; in democracy, politicians do not miss any occasion 
to affirm their intentions and their “creative” interventions for the usage of people’s 
life, how is always pretended. The problem is that in its immeasurable generosity “the 
social  engineer”  interferes  with  economic  laws,  with  the  natural  order  of  an 
economic  reality  governed  by  universal  laws.  This  is  the  reason  for  which  any 
attempt to transform the world, either the material one or the human action one, 
without taking into account the rarity laws, the market laws, the currency laws, etc. 
will have the same success as a governmental decree that would coerce people to fly. 
Economic laws that have their roots in the very human nature are as immune to 
violence as the laws of physics. 
For example, according to the Marxist doctrine, rarity is just a historical category 
that will be liquidated forever and for always by abolishing the private property. The 
socialist doctrine argues that the interest rate is an artificial phenomenon generated 
by  the  payment  means’s  rarity  created  by  men, which  stimulated  the  removal  of 
money  from  “restrictionism”  (the  gold  standard)  and  opened  up  the  way  to 
inflationism,  to  credit expansion. The  myth  of “statist welfare” is  proven  by  the 
action of economic laws in any field: the government makes the goods “cheaper”, 
through imposing maximal pricing, thus leading to poverty; instituting a minimum 
wage leads to unemployment; the increase in money supply does not  signify the 
increase in everybody’s welfare (maybe an increase in the welfare of some at the 
expense  of  others);  financial  assistance  is  incompatible  with  prosperity  since 
redistribution alters responsibility and productive incentives; governmental spending 
cannot create additional jobs
2 but can reallocate the existing jobs between the private 
                                                 
1 In 1888 the French economist Paul Leroy Beaulieu argued that taxing the national production with 
12% was too much and risked to hamper the economic growth and the freedom. Four centuries later 
even  J.  M.  Keynes  evaluated  that  a  tax  rate  of  25%  represents  the  maximum  tolerable  degree. 
However, they did not even imagine what was about to follow in the second half of the 20th century. 
Together with the beginning of the democratic republicanism, the engagement in the two world wars 
and the beginning of developing systems of social security and programs of public spending, the share 
of public spending in GDP increased to 40 and afterwards 50% between 1990 and 2000. 




and public sector. 
If in the past the apparent “failures” of the market economy were listed as 
arguments of statists, today exactly the contrary of this supposed insufficiency (that is 
the  unprecedented  success  of  capitalism)  offers  incentive  to  statists  in  order  to 
subordinate  both  the  state  and  the  society  to  the  market  economy.  The  great 
challenge that liberty is facing in our days is the enormous prosperity – product of 
the private property, the economic market system – whose administration (to be read 
redistribution) the “democratic” governments do not want to miss. 
In fact, whatever governmental interference in the voluntary exchange process 
means the arbitrary reallocation of the property rights implied. This certainly affects 
the entire system of exchange relations based on the manifestation of the affected 
property rights because any governmental intervention is equivalent with one of the 
following two phenomena: on one hand, it takes place the institution of the mandatory 
character of some exchanges that wouldn’t have happened on a voluntary basis in the absence of the 
respective intervention, thus the intervention being unnecessary; on the other hand, it 
takes place the banning of some exchanges (taking them out of the legal framework) that would 
have voluntarily happened in the absence of governmental interventionism. 
Faced  with  the  “perfection”  of  a  more  and  more  statist  social  system,  the 
individuals’ personality as essential unit of analysis is abolished, and the individual is 
made to resign. Any political decision, being it democratic or not, constitutes an economic 
act through the fact that it modifies the allocation of resources and the distribution of 
wealth  in  society.  In  the  real world,  which  is  governed  by  policies  that  generate 
advantages for some and disadvantages for the other, the Pareto optimal solutions become 
impossible.  Moreover,  recognizing  the  impossibility  of  interpersonal  wealth 
comparisons rejects the scientific validity of the argument of “social efficiency”, case 
in which the problem is formulated in terms of “efficiency yes, but for whom?”
1. 
For example, through commercial policy states generally protect internal producers 
from the competition of foreigners. The privileged position of national producers is thus 
made at the expense of consumers that are forbidden to access foreign products, better 
                                                                                                                                      
government can give to an American a dollar is to initially confiscate it through intimidation from 
another American. In other words, in order for the government to make something good it is in the 
position to initially make something bad. If a particular would do the same things as the government 
does, it would be condemned as an ordinary thief. The only difference is legality, but legality sole is 
not an amulet for moral people. This reasoning explains why socialism is bad. It uses bad means 
(coercion) in order to accomplish goals considered as good (helping people)” (Williams, 2000). 
1  In  reality  the  economic  category  of  “efficiency”  is  derived  from  the  fundamental  categories  of 
human action that is those of “means” and “purposes”. Efficiency intervenes when human action has 
as a result the attainment of purposes, meaning that efficient is the economic tribute of successful human 
actions. By reflecting the success of human action, “efficiency” cannot be applied to anything else but 
to personal actions. The fact that efficiency has individual, personal nature also explains its subjective 
character. Only the person that acts is capable of deciding ex post whether the sought end was reached 
or not, by comparing the results with the anticipations that fuelled the action. The appreciation of the 
success or the failure of a choice, of an action, cannot be valid but if it belongs to the person that acts. 




and/or cheaper than national ones. More than this, consumers are in the position to 
even pay for the infringement of their right to have a choice. Thus, some are advantaged 
and others are disadvantaged, fact that is dependent on the capacity of interest groups 
and politicians to buy and respectively to sell privileges, and thus the polarization of society 
in winning and losing groups, one at the expense of the other. 
Taking into account these conditions, how can “the recent economist” decide 
which legislative acts and which governmental policies are efficient since all these 
imply the non proportional distribution of benefits and costs through coercion? Is it about the 
arithmetical comparison of ones’ advantages with the disadvantages of the other, 
having the same denominator, the economist being the one that draws the line and 
makes the final computations? (Marinescu, 2005b:50). 
Actually,  the  undermining  of  the  methodological  individualism  becomes  even 
more powerful since economic theory is captured by the empiric fashion. Mathematics 
and statistics have completely replaced the deductive analytic logic from the classical 
economy and to write in a “scientific” manner is equivalent with a highly complicated 
usage  of  the  mathematical  apparatus.  Specialized  economic  journals  abound  of 
mathematical models that seek to prescribe almost everything, from the quantitative 
sources of economic growth and inflation targeting to models regarding demographic 
fertility  or  sexual  discrimination.  Concepts  like  “human  action”,  “goals”,  “means”, 
“value”,  “incertitude”,  “price”,  “demand”,  “offer”,  “market”,  “welfare”,  “choice”, 
“cost”, “rarity”, “economic calculus” etc. used to ensure until recent times the essence 
of the economic approach; these were replaced in specialized research by a technical 
rhetoric,  borrowed  from  mathematics  and  built  around  terms  like  “function”, 
“variables”, “coefficients”, “derivative”, “integral”, “regression” etc. 
The  mathematical  economic  approach  derived  from  the  works  of  the  Swiss 
neoclassical  economist  Leon  Walras  eliminated  almost  completely  the  current 
language and the verbal logic from economic theory. Austrian school of economics 
and especially Ludwig von Mises systematically argued that mathematical equations 
are useful only for describing the imaginary, static and out of time land of “general 
equilibrium”; immediately after leaving this Nirvana world in order to analyze the 
human actions that take place in the real world, a world of time and anticipations, of 
hopes  and  errors,  the  mathematical  approach  to  economics  becomes  not  only 
irrelevant but also generates confusion and error. 
The laws of human action are not quantitative, but qualitative through their very 
nature; the fact that human beings have objectives and preferences, together with the 
existence  of  the  freedom  to  choose  bans  the  discovery  of  a  general  law  of 
quantitative nature. For example we can rely with absolute certitude on the economic 
law according to which each increase in the offer of one good, will ceteris paribus lead 
to the price decrease of that certain good; this does not allow us to ex ante establish 
how much will the price of good have to decrease at a certain increase in the offer or 
what will the monetary price of the good be in the next period of time, due to the 




The inadequate character of quantitative approaches results from the fact that 
the usage of statistics in order to establish predictable laws implies the fact that in the 
field of human action there can be discovered some confirmable constants, as in 
physics, some invariable quantitative laws. It is less probable that somebody can find 
quantitative  constants  of  human  behavior  taking  into  account  the  fact  that  each 
individual is free to make his own choices and he can decide at whatever moment to 
change the future course of his actions. Moreover, even if it can be discovered an 
equation capable to explain the evolution of all or of some prices in the last 50 years 
there is no guarantee that in the next year the prices will register the same evolution. 
History  and  statistics, whose  relevance  is  through  their  a posteriori  nature,  cannot 
teach us any principle rule or general law because their validity has to be through 
definition a priori. 
The  mathematical  and  quantitative  revolutions  in  economic  theory  became 
subordinated to the obsessive concerns of modern economists of making predictions 
and testing their validity. Beyond the methodological difficulties of comprising all the 
explanatory variables, this prophetic approach is undermined by the phenomenon 
known as the incertitude principle (Heisenberg): if the positivist approach implies 
empiric predictions over economic phenomena, how can these be tested as long as 
making predictions means the very change of the causality factors? 
For  example,  the  famous  economist  X  forecasts  the  appearance  of  a  severe 
recession  in  two  years  time;  in  this  context  the  government  takes  measures  for 
fighting this imminent recession, the public and the financial markets react in the 
desired direction and in this manner the recession does no longer appear. But what is 
the  meaning  of  this  fact:  that  the  prediction  of  economist  X  are  grounded  on 
erroneous  theories,  that  the  theories  were  correct  but  inadequate  to  the  abstract 
situation or that, in opposition, he was right but the promptitude of governmental 
reaction  impeded  the  occurrence  of  the  forecasted  event?  There  is  no  rational 
method of establishing the truth in this case. 
This  reasoning  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  empirical  testing  of  the 
economic theory is impossible, conviction shared also by the old institutionalists that 
unfortunately choose to abandon the path of theory. The theoretician economist 
embraced the path of conceptual science, as deductive edifice built on a complete 
ensemble  of  assumptions  that  are  theoretically  correct  a  priori.  If  the  economist 
cannot test his hypothesis in a framework of controlled experiments, as the physician 
can do, on the other hand, the economist finds himself in a more favorable situation. 
While the physician is sure of his empirical regularities, but is in doubt regarding the 
validity of their generalizations, the economist builds his theory starting not from 
empirical  and  quantitative  regularities,  not  from  particular  to  general,  but  from 
general fundamental axioms whose value of truth is certain; from these he deduces 
particular implications. 
These  praxeological  certitude  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  economic  science  is 




great number of corollaries or successive logical deductions of these principles, as 
Jean Baptiste Say put it. But what are these fundamental axioms, established through 
introspection in the nature and the essence of human action, on which the economic 
theory is established? 
An example of such a fundamental axiom is the very existence of human action 
as such: the fact that people have purposes; that they act in order to attain them, that 
human  action  necessarily  develops  in  time;  that  all  persons  have  hierarchies  of 
preferences, etc. The logical deductions resulted from these axioms are necessarily 
true assumptions: the decreasing marginal utility law, the law of non proportional 
productivity, the law of demand and supply, etc. However the existence of aware 
individual human action is the fundamental axiom of the entire system  of social 
sciences. And the testing of such axioms becomes unnecessary and makes the object 
of contradiction: for example, if somebody seeks to deny that people have goals, 
through this exercise that person in fact assumes a certain goal. Thus it is all about 
simply taking into account some truth that are obvious in themselves, that do not 
need to be empirically proven; thus, it is like somebody would pretend the necessity 
to geometrically test the value of truth of the assumption “there are triangles with 
four sides”. 
If  we  add  up  to  these  methodological  arguments  the  implications  of  the 
spectacular  “impossibility”  theorems  –  the  impossibility  of  formulating  efficiency 
criteria  independent  from  the  ethics  of  property  rights,  the  impossibility  of  the 
appearance  of  money  without  a  market,  the  impossibility  of  productivity 
computations and rational planning under a socialist regime
1, the impossibility of 
“neutral” taxing, the impossibility of limiting the governmental sphere due to the 
logic of political competition, etc. – the result is the theoretical grounds that the 
economic science puts at the bottom of each intellectual effort made in the direction 
of correct knowledge. 
 
                                                 
1 In the economic science, “the impossibility of economic calculus in socialism” is a “trademark” of 
Ludwig  von  Mises  –  the  most  important  exponent  of  Austrianism.  His  1920  article  Die 
Wirtschaftsrechnung im Sozialistischen Gemeinwesen (English translation Economic Calculation in the Socialist 
Commonwealth, 1934) had the effect of an exploder: it proved for the first time that socialism is not a 
viable economic system. Mises proved that, more than the incentive problem, the central planner lacks 
the  possibility  of  ex ante  determining  the  production  structure  and  the  mechanism  of  resource 
allocation. The problem resides in specifying the mechanism through which a central planning council 
can know which production has to be realized, in what quantities, with what techniques and raw 
materials, where should these be distributed, etc. Through abolishing private property over the factors 
of  production  (non humans),  socialism  makes  impossible  the  existence  of  exchange  (of  private 
property rights) and of the market, fact that is equivalent with the impossibility of price formation for 
the factors of production and thus the accountability of production costs is at its turn impossible. In 
Misesian terms, where no market exists, there is no price system, and where there is no price system, 
no “economic calculus” can exist. “The paradox of “planning” is that it cannot exist due to the 
absence of economic calculus. What is called a central planned economy is not at all an economy” 




3. The recourse to ethics 
 
The  majority  of  scientists  share  the  faith  that  an  objective  theory  of  justice  is 
impossible based on universal ethical principles. Obsessed by the efficiency criterion 
and by the maximizing paradigm, the neoclassic scientism from economic theory 
asserts that not only the means and methods used by each individuals are subjective, 
but anything else too. Under these assumptions, the science, the correct knowledge stops 
being a science at all and in the absence of objective criteria any intellectual approach 
is subject to relativity. However, this means the disappearance of borders between 
justice and injustice, between truth and falsity – the most secure means for dissolving 
the basis of the human civilization. Anyhow the economic science teaches us that not the ethics 
principles are those that are subjective, but utilities and costs are subjective economic categories. 
Irrespective of the mutations that appear at the level of the technologies in 
economic life and irrespective of how “old” or “new” is the actual economics, the 
ethical character of human action and the framework in which it manifests remain 
indispensable.  Economic  life  is  a  huge  network  of  exchanges  which,  at  their 
fundamental level do not represent exchanges of goods as such, but exchanges of 
property rights over the goods under question. This proves that any theory of the 
exchange  (of  the  market)  has  to  be  consolidated,  as  preliminary  fact,  by  the 
(legitimate) theory of property rights, and thus the need to know the content of law 
and to argue the justice and legitimacy of these laws. “Property rights” or “property over 
rights”? This is the great challenge of political philosophy and of economics. This is 
the reason for which the fundamental question to which the science has to find an 
answer is: how can the society be designed such that institutional order to be ethic 
and just, and to what extent does this institutional arrangement support the creation 
of wealth and material welfare? 
I do consider that the economic science has to be sensitive to the nature of 
individual objectives and to the means employed for their accomplishment. I hereby 
formulate a plea for the ethical dimension of economics. The economic science is an 
ethical science, mostly on the basis of compulsory distinctions that appear at the level 
of purposes that individuals have to follow and implicitly of the means that he is 
legitimately  empowered  to  use  in  his  actions
1.  Since  economics  operates  in  the 
institutional framework of inter human relations, then the ethical dimension of these 
relations is an indispensable one. Economic theory and history show us that the 
creation of wealth naturally implies an ethical character through the very peaceful 
nature of the means employed, social cooperation through production and voluntary 
exchange  of  legitimate  property  rights,  not  through  aggression,  violence  and 
expropriation, which are lacked of legitimacy. 
                                                 
1 Not any preference can be accepted and not any type of action that would have as a result its 
satisfying is allowed; this is the reason for adding the attribute “legitimate” next to “means” and 
“goals”. The initiation of interpersonal relations (or equivalently the formation of society) implies 
something more than the demand of satisfying the best all the needs, expressed by all economists after 




Defining the sphere of correct (incorrect) actions constitutes the natural results 
of  creating  and  enforcing  the  institution  of  rights  that  has  in  this  way  become  the 
biggest invention of humans in their entire history, through the very fact that this 
institution made possible the formation and the existence of society. Only in this 
manner it becomes possible to define the infringements of rights, under the form of 
interferences  in  the  control  that  an  individual  legitimately  exercises  over  his 
properties. 
Human reasoning has the capacity to discover the (natural) law, starting with the 
profound tendencies of human nature that are absolute, immutable and universally 
valid in all time and place. This means that the natural law offers an objective ensemble of 
ethical norms for evaluating the legitimacy of human actions at any time and under any 
circumstances (Rothbard, 1991). In this manner the rational natural right becomes 
the  necessary  guide  for  the  nascence  of  the  positive  system  of  law  and/or  for 
reforming the existing legal arrangements, due to the fact that the theorists of natural 
right derive from the very human nature and from the natural laws, a law system 
independent of epoch and place, but also independent of customs, traditions and 
collective values. 
After Max Weber the dominant position in social sciences, at least de jure, was 
the one of Wertfreiheit, the idea that science does not have to incorporate value 
judgments  but  positive  (objective)  statements,  due to  the  fact  that  the  end  goals 
wouldn’t be anything else but personal preferences that are susceptible of a rational 
justification. The fact that J. M. Keynes affirmed that economic science is a moral 
science did not impeached him to contribute, through his political implications of his 
work, at the destroying of the ethical character of economic science. Unfortunately, 
the  conception  of  classical  philosophy,  according  to  which  a  system  of  rational 
norms and scientific moral values is possible, has been completely abandoned. 
Today, the result is the conservation of o positive pseudo economy, based not 
on the value judgments of the scientist, but on a supposed consensus over others’ 
values. The idea that the value judgments that are necessary to the scientific approach 
are  those  of  the  “population”  literally  suffocates  the  social  sciences.  Thus,  the 
scientific objectivity would not comprise the search for truth – whatever it may be – 
but  the  matching  of  conclusions  with  others’  subjectivity, whatever  little  advised 
would  they  be.  However,  it  has  to  be  understood  that  value  judgments  do  not 
become right or legitimate through the fact that a great number of persons adopt 
those convictions. Very often the scientist is associated with a “professional” asked 
to offer to his clients – to the public – the most adequate recipes for attaining their 
goals (whatever they may be?). In reality the problem is correctly stated once it is 
accepted the impossibility of avoiding to choose between good and bad. The scientist, whose 
ultimate purpose is the correct knowledge, cannot ignore the ethical dimension of 
the teachings that his research promotes. 
An  individual  that  knowingly  advises  a  band  of  delinquents  about  the  best 




objective.  The  economist  that  advises  the  government  regarding  the  best  policy 
aimed at socializing and equalizing the wealth in society, becomes himself a means 
for  accomplishing  this  egalitarian  objective,  irrespective  of  his  faiths.  If  this 
economist is aware of the shortcomings of the institutional arrangement of socialism 
(primordially  ethical,  complementary  economic)  but,  due  to  material  reasons  of 
personal glory, “scientifically” recommends the implementation of this system, is not 
at all a scientist. The same conclusion is valid when, captive in the utopia of his 
project, the scientist becomes incapable of distinguishing good from bad, of listening 
the judgments of the reason as an indispensable means for understanding his life, as 
it was left. 
Ethics is the rule of legitimate property rights, the rule of justice, of freedom in society. 
Only ethical principles can provide objective criteria for consolidating life in society, 
by solving the potential conflicts. This implies the sanctioning of those that aim at 
the attainment of other purposes than the legitimate ones. Life in society implies 
something more than the demand expressed by neoclassical economists: the best 
manner of satisfying the needs, which for some would mean steal, fraud, violence 
and exploitation. Not any purpose can be accepted and not any means that lead to 
this purpose can be allowed. 
Under  these  assumptions  the  only  fundamental  criterion  that  may  save  the 
scientific nature of the economy is that provided by ethics
1. The economic judgments 
become complete when they are complemented with ethics, since economics, laws 
and  ethics  are  naturally  correlated  and  represent  the  means  for  the  correct 
understanding of the human society. 
Almost  all  problems  formulated  in  this  article  explain  and  reflect  the 
epistemological and methodological crisis that characterizes the actual evolution of 
science, with the consequence of its depersonalization. If the things really converge 
in this manner than it seems that the practical solution can be only one like the 
teachings of Poincaré: “there is nothing more practical than a good theory” in the 
sense of generalizing the validity of this teaching and, in the same time, of correct 
theories. I do consider that the interest to make up a good, correct theory, whatever 
the conclusions and the implications of it may be, has to represent the milestone of 
whatever scientific approach and also the honesty proof of each scientist. In this 
manner  I  do  plead  for  logic  and  reasoning  as  indispensable  instruments  for 
combating  error  and  thus,  against  the  relativist  doctrine,  as  undermining  the 
credibility of the (scientific) truth. 
  
                                                 
1  See  Murray  Rothbard  (1991),  www.mises.org/rothbard/ethics/ethics.asp.  Rothbard  is  the  first 
“Austrian” that systematically recommends the utilitarian position dominant in the economic science, 
position represented by Mises himself in the tradition of the Austrian school  of economics. The 
Misesian plea for the free market was argued for in a utilitarian manner, somehow empiric, through its 
superior efficiency. In reality the debate over the free market system has to be mainly based on ethical 
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